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Market Report Year 
Ago 
4 Wks 
Ago 9/19/14 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average       
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . .  . 125.23 152.66 158.42 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . . 183.84 258.48 276.25 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. . 161.01 226.79 235.53 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192.94 251.96 246.23 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 94.94 95.81 104.66 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97.80 106.58 110.50 
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr.,  Heavy, 
Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . . 125.18 157.88 162.88 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280.82 364.00 368.21 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices       
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.59 5.58 4.75 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 4.86 3.49 3.12 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 13.15 12.52 10.57 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.34 6.09 5.21 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.34 3.95 3.79 
Feed       
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . * 192.50 191.25 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140.00 100.00 90.00 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 132.50 87.50 87.50 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215.75 97.50 118.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75.25 38.00 35.00 
  ⃰ No Market 
      
Increasingly agricultural policy has turned from di-
rect counter-cyclical commodity programs toward 
social insurance and risk management programs.  
Congress attempted to entice producer participation 
in the crop insurance program by increasing premi-
um subsidies and introduction of new crop insur-
ance contracts through the Agricultural Reform Act 
of 1994 and the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 
2000.  Higher subsidies and expanded contract op-
tions helped fuel an increase in insured acreage.  
Insured acres increased from 100 million to 265 
million between 1994 and 2009 (USDA-RMA Bul-
letin).  Also, during this timeframe other undesired 
outcomes may have emerged.  Subsidized and com-
plex crop insurance programs may increase the like-
lihood that profit-maximizing producers can use 
information advantages to garner returns above 
what the government intends.  The excess returns 
would result in increased costs to taxpayers and po-
tentially inefficient reallocations of resources in ag-
riculture.  
The root of inefficiency in insurance lies in asym-
metric information.  These inefficiencies are gener-
ally subsumed under the categories of adverse se-
lection (or anti-selection) (Akerlof 1970) or moral 
hazard (Arrow 1985), or both.  An example of ad-
verse selection would be the purchase of crop insur-
ance (provision) where the insured has information 
unknown to the insurer, and so can obtain excess 
expected returns.  Essentially, the insured is using 
loaded dice, and the insurer does not know it.  Mor-
al hazard occurs when participants change their 
(risky) actions when insured – for example, by 
adopting more risky inputs or crop regimes.  In agri- 
 
by producer, amount of subsidy, crop type, num-
ber of acres, field practice, coverage level, unit 
type, insurance type, year, county location of unit, 
and type of APH (actual and/or T-yields).  We 
conducted our analysis using data for five differ-
ent growing regions, two with relatively homoge-
nous within-county land resources (Iowa and 
Western Nebraska) and three with more heteroge-
neous land resources (Oklahoma, North-Central 
Montana, and Eastern Washington).  To permit an 
examination of the effects of the heterogeneity of 
land resources, we limited our data sample to non-
irrigated agricultural production.  Even with the 
limited number of regions and considering only 
non-irrigated production, the data set includes a 
total of 392,035 observations. 
We conducted our analysis using data for five dif-
ferent growing regions, two with relatively ho-
mogenous within-county land resources (Iowa and 
Western Nebraska) and three with more heteroge-
neous land resources (Oklahoma, North-Central 
Montana, and Eastern Washington).  To permit an 
examination of the effects of the heterogeneity of 
land resources, we limited our data sample to non-
irrigated agricultural production.  Even with the 
limited number of regions and considering only 
non-irrigated production, the data set includes a 
total of 392,035 observations. 
Results 
With space constraints I, as one of the authors, am 
focusing only on results from Nebraska.  Statistics 
to examine the null hypothesis that producer se-
lection of higher coverage levels (75% and great-
er), optional units, and revenue insurance did not 
provide evidence of opportunistic behavior are 
presented in Table 1.  Significant positive margin-
al effects of coverage level by crop and practice 
provide evidence of the exercise of opportunistic 
behavior in an otherwise neutral insurance market 
with the subsidy implemented consistent with pol-
icy.  In Nebraska the percent of positive coverage 
level marginal effects that were significant at the 
5% level was 15%.  The average magnitude was 
$16 per acre with a maximum of $72 per acre and 
minimum of $4 per acre.  The average magnitude 
exceeded the average indemnity ($8 per acre) over 
the study period.  There was no evidence of op-
portunistic behavior in the optional unit and reve-
nue insurance selection in Nebraska.  Nebraska 
demonstrated evidence of opportunistic behavior 
from  the  use  of  T-yields.  Nebraska  had  7% of  
culture the boundary between choosing to participate 
in insurance programs versus altering management 
practices because of participation can be ambiguous -
- since often the insurance  provision decision and 
the operational  production decisions occur simulta-
neously.  Hence, it is often difficult to distinguish 
empirically between adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton 1993).  In 
this study, we were not concerned about the category 
of behavior (i.e., adverse selection or moral hazard), 
but only whether and to what degree such actions 
occur.  Hence, we use the generic term 
“opportunism” and “opportunistic behavior” to indi-
cate either or both forms of (rational, profit-
maximizing, but inefficient) behavior under infor-
mation asymmetry.   
To address several issues faced by insurance program 
designers and administrators, we empirically exam-
ined some recent crop insurance experience.  We ex-
amined whether insurance contract characteristics 
stray from the neutral revenue impacts one would 
expect from actuarially neutral insurance (i.e., with 
premium rates set to cover expected costs under 
complete information) beyond the impact of subsi-
dies and, if so, by how much.  We looked for evi-
dence of such deviation by examining returns to par-
ticular features of insurance.  If variation in unit-level 
crop insurance returns (other than the subsidy) is sys-
tematically associated with insurance contract char-
acteristics or with geographic region for a representa-
tive time period, then either the insurance is not actu-
arially neutral or the subsidy is not implemented ac-
cording to policy.  Either case would permit partici-
pants to exploit opportunities within the insurance 
system to make profits, e.g., by exploiting contracts 
that are too cheap relative to those that would emerge 
under neutral insurance. We investigated whether 
producers using different insurance contracts 
(including buy-up coverage, unit type, revenue insur-
ance, and T-yield) may have strategic advantages in 
their contract selection.   
Data 
The data included observations of crop insurance 
contract information and corresponding performance 
records for all insured units by the Federal Crop In-
surance Corporation ( FCIC) for each of 14 years – 
1996 through 2009.  Only insured units are included 
in the data set.  Producers can change insurance con-
tracts on each unit from year to year.  The data set 
includes all information the FCIC has for each crop 
insurance contract: indemnity amount, premium paid  
 
significant positive T-yield marginal effects.  The aver-
age, maximum and minimum values of these marginal 
effects were lower than for higher coverage level se-
lection.  Findings suggest that the potential exists for 
producers to profit by selecting higher coverage levels 
and/or by the advantageous use of T-yields.   
Reducing producer opportunism would create a more 
cost-efficient risk management program that would 
limit the ability of producers to extract net profits from 
participation beyond the intentional subsidy provided 
to induce higher rates of participation.  In Nebraska 
two of the four decision categories demonstrated evi-
dence of significant producer opportunism.  The ex-
ceptions were the use of T-yields and the decision to 
purchase revenue insurance.  Relative to average in-
demnities, the magnitudes were often quite large.   
 Opportunism was judged through an assessment of 
subsidy-adjusted net profits since actuarially neutral 
insurance with no asymmetric information   
should produce zero profits beyond the intentional 
subsidy used to induce participation.  Given an 
efficiency goal, our finding suggests that an in-
crease in rates for higher coverage levels and a 
restructuring of the T-yield system is warranted to 
decrease the effect of producer opportunism.  
However, the results do not support the hypothesis 
that producers profit by selecting revenue insur-
ance (and optional units in Nebraska), nor that 
high levels of government “incompetence” exist in 
the design and administration of the crop insur-
ance system. 
 
The manuscript was printed in the Journal of Ap-
plied Economics Perspectives and Policy and can 
be found here http://aepp.oxfordjournals.org/  For 
questions about the manuscript please contact 
Cory Walters at cwalters7@unl.edu  
Table 1. Significant and Positive Marginal Effect Estimates for Crop Insurance                       
   Contract Decisions 
Significant Positive Marginal 
Effects (5% level) 
Nebraska 
Coverage 
Level 
Optional 
Unit 
T-yields 
Revenue 
Insurance 
Number significant 9 0 4 0 
Percent of higher coverage 
level marginal effects signifi-
cant 
15 0 7 0 
Average value ($/acre) 15.54 0.00 2.70 0.00 
Maximum value ($/acre) 71.66 0.00 6.73 0.00 
Minimum value ($/acre)  3.82 0.00 1.32 0.00 
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